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The Disguise of Municipal Bonds: How a Safe 
Bet in Investing Can Become an Unexpected 
Uncertainty During Municipal Bankruptcy 
ABSTRACT 
When revenue is low, municipalities often use general obligation or special 
revenue bonds to meet their budgetary needs. In issuing bonds, 
municipalities promise to repay bondholders; however, when a 
municipality files for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, repayment may be prolonged 
or even precluded. Special revenue bond repayment is subject to the 
“necessary operating expenses” of the municipality, as established by 11 
U.S.C. § 928.  However, the Bankruptcy Code leaves this phrase undefined.  
This Comment attempts to assign meaning to this phrase through an 
analysis of the Jefferson County, Alabama, bankruptcy. This Comment 
further identifies factors that investors should consider before purchasing 
municipal bonds to ensure a return on investment. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the housing and subprime mortgage crises caused one of the 
most significant recessions this country has ever seen.1  The mortgage crisis 
“slowed consumer spending, increased unemployment, and restricted credit 
markets,”2 negatively affecting economic health all the way down to 
individual communities.3  State and local governments experienced 
massive budget gaps due to weak tax collections.4  States saw some of the 
 
 1. See CHRISTINE R. MARTELL & ADAM GREENWADE, BUECHNER INST. FOR 
GOVERNANCE, AN ANALYSIS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE (2013), http://www.ucden 
ver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/spaweb/Documents/Martell%20Brief%20BIG%20Fin.pdf 
(outlining the effects of the housing and subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 on the consumer and 
credit markets, unemployment rates, and local government). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Michael F. Thompson, State Revenue Collection Through the Great Recession, IND. 
BUS. REV., Fall 2013, at 8. 
 4. Phil Oliff et al., States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (June 27, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf (“The budget 
gaps result principally from weak tax collections.  The Great Recession that started in 2007 
caused the largest collapse in state revenues on record.”). 
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lowest collected revenues in history,5 ultimately reaching an all-time low in 
2010.6 
Because the primary revenue source for local governments is property 
tax, local governments are typically more resistant than states to 
fluctuations in the economy, and they may see smaller decreases in tax-
revenue collection during an economic downturn.  Property tax constitutes 
almost 80% of local tax collection, with income and sales taxes comprising 
much smaller percentages.7  During the recession, however, falling home 
prices led to lower tax values, leaving local governments with a 
significantly diminished source of revenue.8 
In response to the recession, many local governments implemented 
measures to reduce spending.  Local governments instituted “hiring and 
pay freezes, pay cuts, layoffs, furloughs, early retirement incentives, and 
buyouts.”9 For the debt already incurred, local governments “renegotiate[d] 
debt, delay[ed] or cancel[ed] projects and contracts, and ma[de] cuts 
to . . . infrastructure repairs, libraries and senior services.”10 
As revenue and federal aid decreased, demand for public services 
increased.11  Local governments spent a substantial amount of money 
providing social, economic, and health services.12  Financially distressed 
municipalities resorted to restructuring their finances, particularly through 
bankruptcy.13  Filing for bankruptcy protection can help to relieve some of 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Jiri Jonas, Great Recession and Fiscal Squeeze at U.S. Subnational Government 
Level 15 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/184, 2012), available at https:// 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12184.pdf. 
 8. Id. at 11. 
 9. Joshua Franzel, The Great Recession, U.S. Local Governments, and e-Government 
Solutions, PM MAG., Sept. 2010, http://webapps.icma.org/pm/9208/public/pmplus1.cfm? 
author=Joshua%20Franzel&title=The%20Great%20Recession%2C%20U.S.%20Local%20
Governments%2C%20and%20e-Government%20Solutions. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Jonas, supra note 7, at 10 (“The Great Recession had a severe impact on state and 
local government finances . . . . At the same time, the recession ‘automatically’ increased 
demand for a range of state-provided services . . .”). 
 12. Oliff et al., supra note 4, at 1 (explaining that “[t]he vast majority of these [budget] 
shortfalls have been closed through spending cuts and other measures in order to meet 
balanced-budget requirements”).  Moreover, “[t]o the extent these shortfalls are being 
closed with spending cuts, they are occurring on top of past years’ deep cuts in critical 
public services like education, health care, and human services.”  Id. 
 13. David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 684 (2012) 
(outlining six benefits of state bankruptcy and undercutting the common objections to it). 
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the municipality’s financial strain, but it can cause stress and uncertainty 
for bondholders.14 
This Comment provides a brief overview of Chapter 9 municipal 
bankruptcy.  Part I discusses the history of municipal bankruptcy and 
outlines the prerequisites for filing.  Part II discusses two types of 
municipal bonds, as well as their benefits and risks to both municipalities 
and bond purchasers.  Part III explores the effect of a bankruptcy filing on 
municipal bonds by examining the recent municipal bankruptcy filing of 
Jefferson County, Alabama, and how it handled special revenue bond 
claims.  Finally, Part IV highlights factors for investors to consider before 
purchasing municipal bonds, in light of the Jefferson County Chapter 9 
bankruptcy. 
I. MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY 
Municipal bankruptcy originated in the mid-1930s as a way for 
Congress to extend bankruptcy relief to municipalities.15 Congress 
recognized that state and municipal governments needed access to 
bankruptcy protection, especially after the financial crisis of the Great 
Depression, which was felt by every level of government.16  Between 1929 
and 1937, there were approximately 4,700 defaults by governmental 
entities.17 
To expand bankruptcy protection, however, Congress had to be 
mindful of the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of the states’ right to 
sovereignty over their internal affairs, including how states handle debt 
acquisition and payment.18  To extend bankruptcy protection while also 
 
 14. See infra notes 71–76, 91–115 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Rachael E. Schwartz, This Way to the Egress: Should Bridgeport’s Chapter 9 
Filing Have Been Dismissed?, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 114–15 (1992). Specifically, federal 
law did not provide for municipal bankruptcy until 1934.  Id. at 114. 
 16. See id. at 114–15 (explaining that the first federal bankruptcy legislation was a 
direct byproduct of the Great Depression); see also Joseph M. Witalec & Mark G. Douglas, 
Chapter 9 Descends Into the Sewer to Clean Up, JONES DAY 2 (Mar.–Apr. 2012), 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/c2b8d4fd-416f-4747-a330-f3b49d1a15bb/Presen 
tation/PublicationAttachment/bbe7f15d-1a64-4bc3-b41dbcc48af5311a/Jefferson%20County 
%20chapter%209%20BRR%20Mar_Apr%202012.pdf (providing that Congress’s decision 
to implement the new federal municipal bankruptcy law was “[u]shered in during the Great 
Depression to fill a vacuum that previously existed in both federal and state law”). 
 17. JAMES E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL DEBT 
ADJUSTMENT 3 (2012), available at http://www.afgi.org/resources/Bankruptcy_Primer.pdf. 
 18. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”); see also Witalec & Douglas, supra note 16, at 2 (suggesting that federal 
3
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respecting Tenth Amendment rights, Congress created a separate chapter of 
the federal Bankruptcy Code: Chapter 9.19  Chapter 9 allows a municipality 
to adjust its debts in ways similar to private debtors,20 but limits the powers 
of bankruptcy courts over the debt-adjustment process.21 
Under Chapter 9, political subdivisions can reorganize or adjust their 
debts.22  The process of reorganizing under Chapter 9 includes “extending 
debt maturity dates, reducing principal or interest due on prior debts, or 
refinancing existing debts with new loans or municipal bonds.”23 A 
municipality can file for Chapter 9 relief only if authorized to do so under 
state law.24 
Once a municipality has been authorized to file a Chapter 9 petition, 
the municipality must meet three eligibility requirements. First, the 
municipality must be insolvent.25  According to the Bankruptcy Code, a 
municipality is insolvent if it is unable to pay its current debts when they 
 
municipal bankruptcy law is limited by the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of certain 
states’ rights and the Supreme Court’s striking of the first bankruptcy law as 
unconstitutional in 1936). 
 19. Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798, invalidated by Ashton v. 
Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936).  Chapter 9 was 
created through an amendment to the uniform system of bankruptcy laws that applied 
throughout the United States.  The amendment’s purpose was to help with the “national 
emergency caused by increasing financial difficulties of many local governmental units.”  
Id. § 78, 48 Stat. at 798; see also Schwartz, supra note 15, at 114–15. 
 20. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (indicating that several sections of Chapter 11 on 
reorganization of an individual’s debt, including sections concerning information that must 
be included in the readjustment plan and how to reorganize debt, apply to Chapter 9 
municipal bankruptcy). 
 21. Id. §§ 903–904 (limiting the power of the court to prevent it from interfering with 
any political or governmental powers of the municipality). 
 22. Id. § 901. 
 23. Paul Mignano, Was GM a Municipality?  Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and the 
Definitional Limit of “Government Instrumentality,” 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 529, 535 (2012). 
 24. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2). 
  For instance, section 23-48 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that 
“any taxing district, local improvement district, school district, county, city, town or village” 
may file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy with the “approval of the Local Government Commission 
of North Carolina.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-48 (2013). 
  Similarly, Pennsylvania’s authorization statute requires a city of “the first class” to 
get authorization from the governor before filing for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.  See 53 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 12720.101 (West 2014).  A city of “the first class” under 
Pennsylvania’s structure is one that has a population of one million people or more.  Id. 
  Other states require less oversight.  For example, in the State of Washington, any 
taxing district may file for protection under Chapter 9 as long as it adopts a resolution to 
authorize the filing.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 39.64.050 (2014). 
 25. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3). 
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become due, or if it is generally not paying its undisputed debts as they 
become due.26 
Second, the municipality must “desire[] to effect a plan to adjust [its] 
debts.”27  Finding that a municipality has the “desire” to adjust its debts is a 
highly subjective determination of intent.28  Bankruptcy courts have found 
different forms of proof to be sufficient;29 generally, the municipality must 
show “prepetition efforts to develop and implement a plan to avoid 
bankruptcy, even if that plan eventually fails.”30 
The third eligibility requirement concerns the municipality’s readjustment 
plan—the municipality’s proposed method of satisfying or discharging 
creditors’ claims.31  This eligibility requirement may be satisfied in one of 
four ways.  First, the municipality can obtain the “agreement of creditors 
holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that [the 
municipality] intends to impair under a plan.”32  Second, even if the 
municipality fails to obtain the agreement of the creditors, it may meet its 
eligibility requirement if it has negotiated with those creditors in good 
faith.33  Finally, if such negotiation would be impracticable,34 or if the 
municipality “reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain” a 
preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547,35 the municipality may be deemed to 
have fulfilled its obligation.  If all three of the eligibility requirements are 
met, the municipality can file a petition for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, along 
with a proposed debt-reorganization plan.36   
 
 26. Id. § 101(32)(C). 
 27. Id. § 109(c)(4). 
 28. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 171 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (engaging in an 
in-depth evaluation of Detroit’s “desire,” through a discussion of potential ulterior motives 
as well as the possibility of impairing pensions). 
 29. Compare In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 607 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) 
(proposing a comprehensive settlement agreement, among other steps taken that 
demonstrated efforts to resolve claims which satisfied § 109(c)(4)), with In re Sullivan Cnty. 
Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 76 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (holding that a 
postpetition submission of a draft plan of adjustment met the requirements of § 109(c)(4)). 
 30. Mignano, supra note 23, at 536. 
 31. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.02[2][d], at 900-22 to -23 (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2014). 
 32. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(A). 
 33. Id. § 109(c)(5)(B). 
 34. Id. § 109(c)(5)(C). 
 35. Id. § 109(c)(5)(D). 
 36. Lauren M. Wolfe, Comment, The Next Financial Hurricane?  Rethinking Municipal 
Bankruptcy in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REV. 555, 565 (2012) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)). 
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Once a municipality files a Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition, the 
bankruptcy court issues an automatic stay,37 halting all actions to enforce 
claims for debt, including enforcement of liens on taxes owed.38  Although 
the stay and plan of adjustment under Chapter 9 are beneficial to a 
municipality, the effect on bondholders is considerably less favorable.39 
II. MUNICIPAL BONDS 
A local government’s ability to meet its obligations varies based on 
the services that its residents need, as well as the amount of revenue that it 
collects.  Tax revenue is one of the largest sources of revenue for most state 
and local governments.40  During an economic downturn, tax revenues 
decline, forcing local governments to operate with less funding.41  Adding 
to the financial strain, most state and local governments are required by law 
to maintain balanced budgets.42  This requirement places a restriction on 
spending that makes it difficult for governments to pay for day-to-day 
operations, public services, and the maintenance and upkeep of 
infrastructure.43 Further, state and local governments are required to 
provide “basic infrastructure, education, and health and safety services at 
 
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 922(a). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Famose T. Garner, Comment, Putting the Honest Back in “Honest but Unfortunate 
Debtor”: A Debtor’s Duty to Report a Beneficial Change in Circumstances, 47 HOUS. L. 
REV. 105, 130 (2010) (explaining that some debtors have abused the Code as a means of 
avoiding debt repayment, and that under the current laws, a debtor does not have to report a 
beneficial change in income, providing a “‘head start’ instead of a ‘fresh start’” for the 
debtor). 
 40. Indeed, taxes accounted for almost 40% of local-government revenues in 2011.  See 
Christine Sgarlata Chung, Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: The Brutal 
Competition for State and Local Government Resources Given Municipal Securities Debt, 
Pension and OBEP Obligations, and Taxpayer Needs, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 663, 676 
(2014) [hereinafter Chung, Hunger Games]. 
 41. These periods of decreased revenue often correspond with a need to expand 
community services.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF: 
FISCAL STRESS FACED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 2 (2010), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/ 
files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12005/12-09-municipalities_brief.pdf. 
 42. Peter Molk, Comment, Broadening the Use of Municipal Mortgages, 27 YALE J. ON 
REG. 397, 398 (2010) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-122 (West 2008) (requiring 
municipalities to set taxes to balance budgets); Ronald K. Snell, State Balanced Budget 
Requirements: Provisions and Practice, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl. 
org/research/fiscal-policy/state-constitutional-and-statutory-requirements-fo.aspx (last up-
dated Mar. 2004) (noting that forty-nine states have balanced-budget requirements)). 
 43. Chung, Hunger Games, supra note 40, at 671–74 (discussing the tension between 
state and local governments’ obligations to provide public services with limited revenue). 
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all times,”44 which means that certain budget cuts or downsizing are not 
always possible.45 
With restricted funding and balanced-budget requirements, local 
governments have to resort to other sources of funding, mainly by issuing 
municipal bonds.46  A municipal bond is defined as “a type of interest-
bearing debt instrument issued by state or local governments to fund certain 
types of financial needs.”47  Historically, municipalities issue two types of 
bonds: general obligation bonds and special revenue bonds.48 The 
difference between the two types of bonds is the type of collateral used to 
secure payments of interest and principal, and the types of risk that the 
bonds carry.49  The two types of bonds are discussed in more detail below. 
A. General Obligation Bonds 
General obligation bonds are debt instruments issued by state and 
local governments to raise funds for public projects.50  A general obligation 
bond is a tool used by municipalities to raise money for projects and 
services that will not provide a source of revenue, such as roads, bridges, 
parks, and equipment.51  State and local law determine how general 
obligation bonds are secured and what funds are used for their repayment.52  
Typically, general obligation bonds are secured by the municipality’s “full 
faith and credit,”53 meaning that the municipality has committed to use all 
available revenue resources through its general revenue powers to pay the 
principal and interest of the bond.54  Essentially, the municipality promises 
 
 44. Id. at 672. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 683. 
 47. Arthur Flynn, Note, The Life and Premature Death of BABS: A Proposal to 
Reinstate the Subsidized Taxable Municipal Bond, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 673, 
676 (2012) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 76 (3d pocket ed. 2006)). 
 48. Id. at 677 (citing Randle B. Pollard, Who’s Going to Pick Up the Trash?—Using the 
Build America Bond Program to Help State and Local Governments’ Cash Deficits, 8 PITT. 
TAX REV. 171, 178 (2011)). 
 49. See id. at 677 n.39 (citing Pollard, supra note 28, at 178–79). 
 50. Id. at 676–77. 
 51. Id.; see also MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., SPECIAL COMMENT: U.S. MUNICIPAL BOND 
DEFAULTS AND RECOVERIES, 1970-2011, at 2 (2012), http://www.nhhefa.com/ 
documents/moodysMunicipalDefaultStudy1970-2011.pdf (stating that general obligation 
bonds are sold to fund projects that improve the physical infrastructure of a municipality). 
 52. NAT’L ASS’N BOND LAWYERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE LAW, 
BANKRUPTCY AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS 13 (2014), http://www.nabl.org/uploads/c 
ms/documents/GENERAL_OBLIGATION_MUNICIPAL_BONDS.pdf. 
 53. Id. at 2. 
 54. Id. at 2–3. 
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to use its power to levy taxes in order to meet the general obligation bonds 
when they become due.55  The taxing power used to meet this obligation 
varies depending on the municipality’s laws.56  Some municipalities may 
secure general obligation bonds with property taxes,57 which allows the 
municipality to raise property taxes if other sources of revenue are 
insufficient to pay for the general obligation debt.58 
General obligation bonds are considered the best investment among 
municipal bonds.59  Because they are secured by full faith and credit, 
investors are ensured that their bonds will be repaid, even if the 
municipality has to raise its taxes.60  A municipality’s ability to raise its 
taxes to repay general obligation bonds lowers the occurrence of defaults 
and lowers the risk of loss to investors.61 
General obligation bonds are beneficial to a municipality as well, but 
are limited in their ability to help with the municipality’s need for 
additional funding. Many municipalities have a statutory cap on the amount 
of debt that the municipality is allowed to incur, and general obligation 
bonds typically count toward this cap.62 Considering the recent recession, 
the maximum amount that can be borrowed may be much less than the 
amount that the municipality needs.  When the municipality reaches its 
 
 55. KROLL BOND RATINGS, NOT ALL G.O. BONDS ARE CREATED EQUAL 3–4 (2013), 
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/seminars/2014/20140205/kroll.pdf (defining general 
obligation bonds, which, depending on the level of government that issues the bond, can be 
secured by a limited or an unlimited property tax rate, the general fund, or by guaranteed 
debt and discussing the corresponding taxing power that comes with each type of general 
obligation bond as well as what risks these bonds pose on the issuing local government’s 
credit rating). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 3. 
 59. See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local 
Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities for 
Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1465, 1469 (2013) [hereinafter Chung, Municipal 
Securities] (arguing that regulations are concerned with risk and municipal markets, but that 
the risks to issuers and taxpayers should be instead regulated by federal securities laws). 
 60. Id. at 1469 (“Although default rates tend to be higher for revenue bonds, issuers’ 
obligation to tap dedicated revenues has kept default rates (and thus investor losses) in 
relative check.”). 
 61. Id. at 1470.  General obligation bonds are used “to finance public facilities that do 
not produce revenues, or when it is thought to be inappropriate to levy fees for use as a 
matter of public policy.”  Id. at 1466. 
 62. For example, Illinois prohibits any municipality with a population of less than half a 
million people from incurring a total debt exceeding “8.625% of the value of the taxable 
property” within that municipality.  65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-5-1 (2012). 
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/7
2015] THE DISGUISE OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 195 
debt limit, it must look for other forms of financing, such as special 
revenue bonds.63 
B. Special Revenue Bonds 
Special revenue bonds are debt instruments that are issued to fund 
public works and infrastructure projects that are designed to improve the 
municipality.64  Under the Bankruptcy Code, “special revenue” includes 
any receipts, special excise taxes, or other revenues derived from projects 
or systems of the municipality that are primarily used to provide 
transportation, utility, and other services that are owned, operated, or 
disposed of by the municipality.65  For example, projects that may be built 
or improved with special revenue bonds include toll roads and sewer 
systems.66  Although the revenues received are part of general taxes levied 
by the municipality, this revenue is attributable to the improvements of the 
financed project.67 
Special revenue bonds are secured “only by the revenue stream 
generated from a distinct source, usually the underlying project the bonds 
are used to finance.”68  Since these bonds are self-funded by an identifiable 
revenue stream that is not based on the municipality’s usual tax collections, 
such as property and income taxes, special revenue bonds do not count 
toward a municipality’s statutory debt limit.69  Because these bonds have a 
limited revenue source and, thus, carry a higher risk of default, the bonds 
 
 63. Molk, supra note 42, at 399.  Molk suggests: 
  Many municipalities have ceilings on the amount of debt they can incur.  
Typically, general obligation bonds count toward this ceiling, but [special] 
revenue bonds do not.  Revenue bonds thus offer an important form of financing 
if municipalities approach or break through their debt ceiling.  Because pure 
revenue bonds are self-funded by an identified revenue stream, they do not count 
as debt . . . . 
Id. 
 64. Mignano, supra note 23, at 537 (“Special revenue bonds remain secured and 
serviced during the pendency of the [C]hapter 9 case.  These special revenue bonds are often 
distributed in order to fund public works such as hospitals, stadiums, or other public 
infrastructure projects.”). 
 65. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2) (2012). 
 66. Chung, Municipal Securities, supra note 59, at 1466; SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 29 
(defining “special revenues” and providing examples of each of the five types of special 
revenues as set out in 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)). 
 67. SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 29. 
 68. Molk, supra note 42, at 399. 
 69. Id. at 399–400. 
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incur higher interest rates.70  The higher interest rates and the security of 
the project itself appeal to investors.71  Despite the higher risk of default, 
investors will see the link between how their money is used to improve the 
municipality and repayment of the special revenue bonds, increasing their 
confidence in purchasing these bonds.72 
III. MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY’S EFFECT ON MUNICIPAL BONDS 
When a municipality files for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, what once 
seemed to be a good investment can become a significant loss for 
bondholders. General obligation bondholders and special revenue 
bondholders are given different priority,73 which determines whether the 
bondholders will receive payment on their investment in the municipality 
during the stay and after the municipality readjusts its debt.74 
General obligation bonds are treated as part of the municipality’s 
“general debt.”75  Those who have been issued general obligation bonds are 
treated as general unsecured creditors during the bankruptcy process.76  
After a municipality has filed for bankruptcy and a stay has been placed on 
all payments to creditors, payments on bonds will be stayed as well.77  
Creditors holding special revenue bonds, however, fare much better than 
those who hold general obligation bonds during a Chapter 9 bankruptcy. 
 
 70. Chung, Municipal Securities, supra note 59, at 1466 n.37 (quoting ROBERT L. 
BLAND, A BUDGETING GUIDE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT 171 (2007)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Priority determines which creditor, or class of creditors, gets paid first and how 
much they get repaid.  See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property 
Rights in Municipal Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609, 613 (2014) (“Creditors 
with claims having equal priority share equally in proportion to their claims.” (citing 
Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 667 (2006); Sampsell v. 
Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177–78 
(1977))).  As explained above in this Comment, the Bankruptcy Code grants some creditors 
higher priority than others.  Secured creditors, such as special revenue bondholders, are 
given higher priority than general, unsecured creditors, like general obligation 
bondholders—meaning, special revenue holders will be paid before general obligation 
bondholders.  Id. 
 74. 11 U.S.C. § 928 (2012); see Mignano, supra note 23, at 537 (“General obligation 
bondholders are treated as general creditors, holding claims to be redeemed in the 
bankruptcy process.  Special revenue bonds remain secured and serviced during the 
pendency of the [C]hapter 9 case.”). 
 75. 11 U.S.C. §§ 552, 928(a); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 4–5 (1988). 
 76. 11 U.S.C. § 928; Mignano, supra note 23, at 537; SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 32. 
 77. SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at F-3. 
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Special revenue bonds remain secured and are paid during the 
pendency of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy case.78  The Bankruptcy Code, in a 
sense, rewards investors who have helped fund projects that will improve 
the municipality through providing these bonds with priority.79  The Code 
provides that any prepetition pledge or obligation terminates upon the filing 
of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition, but only as to property acquired after 
the filing of the petition.80  However, rights to proceeds of the property 
subject to the lien, such as the project securing special revenue bonds, are 
not terminated.81  In the case of special revenue bonds, “the security 
interest in ‘special revenues’ remains valid and enforceable even though 
such revenues are received after a Chapter 9 filing.”82  Thus, special 
revenue bondholders continue to receive payment on those bonds, despite 
the bankruptcy filing.83 
Although special revenue bondholders receive priority, repayment of 
these bonds can still be uncertain.  Repayment of special revenue bonds is 
subject to § 928(b), which exempts the “necessary operating expenses” of 
the project or system that was financed by the bonds.84  However, the 
Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define which costs are “necessary 
operating expenses” of a municipal project.85  Consequently, the phrase is 
open to subjective interpretations, “ranging from something that is 
absolutely needed to something that is needed, but not essential.”86 
Since “necessary operating expenses” has not been defined in the 
Bankruptcy Code, municipalities must look to other sources, such as 
legislative history, to determine what expenses will receive priority over all 
other payments to creditors and bondholders.  The legislative history of 
Chapter 9 suggests that “necessary operating expenses” are those expenses 
that are “necessary to keep the project or system going and producing 
special revenues.”87 Prepetition operating expenses may qualify as 
 
 78. 11 U.S.C. § 928; Mignano, supra note 23, at 537. 
 79. Mignano, supra note 23, at 537. 
 80. SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 26. 
 81. Id.  Although the Bankruptcy Code does not directly define what constitutes 
“proceeds,” and the term has not been addressed in case law, amendments to the Code 
provide clarity as to what the term “proceeds” includes.  Id. 
 82. Id. at 27. 
 83. Id. 
 84. 11 U.S.C. § 928(b) (2012). 
 85. See id. §§ 101, 928(b) (emphasis added). 
 86. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Jefferson Cnty. (In re Jefferson Cnty.) (Jefferson II), 474 
B.R. 725, 752 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.), amended, 482 B.R. 404 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012). 
 87. F COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31, app. pt. 41(g)(ii)(A), at 41-130 
(providing the legislative history of the 1988 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code). 
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“necessary operating expenses,” but the legislative history reflects that a 
court can ultimately determine whether these prepetition expenses are truly 
necessary for the purpose of generating special revenues.88 
The lack of guidance from the Code as to what constitutes a 
“necessary operating expense” has recently led to litigation and, as a result, 
has provided an interpretation of the term.  Analysis of the recent litigation 
can provide investors with insight as to what constitutes a “necessary 
operating expense,” helping them to make better investment decisions the 
next time they have the opportunity to purchase special revenue bonds. 
A. Municipal Bankruptcy in Jefferson County, Alabama 
The Jefferson County bankruptcy resulted from the loss of a large part 
of the county’s tax revenue, which exacerbated the municipality’s immense 
preexisting debt.89  In March 2011, the Supreme Court of Alabama struck 
down a business license and occupation tax as improperly implemented by 
the state’s legislature.90  Along with this loss of revenue, which amounted 
to approximately $50 million,91 Jefferson County was facing almost $4 
billion of previously incurred debt.92 Most of the debt came from 
borrowing money in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the form of special 
revenue bonds to finance the construction and repair of the county’s sewer 
system.93 
The Jefferson County sewer system had drastically grown in size, with 
the county acquiring over twenty sewer systems from the local governments of 
both small towns and large cities.94  The county acquired the sewers 
without first determining the condition of these systems, most of which 
were improperly maintained.95  Using special revenue bonds to make the 
appropriate repairs to the newly enlarged sewer system caused the county 
to sink further into debt, and prevented spreading the costs of the repairs 
 
 88. See id. 
 89. In re Jefferson Cnty. (Jefferson I), 474 B.R. 228, 236 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012). 
 90. Jefferson Cnty. v. Weissman, 69 So. 3d 827, 844–45 (Ala. 2011) (holding that the 
tax was improperly advertised because the legislature failed to publish four consecutive 
weekly notices in the affected counties before introducing the bill). 
 91. Updates from the State House, LEGIS. UPDATE (Birmingham Bus. Alliance, 
Birmingham, Ala.), Apr. 1, 2011, at 1, http://www.birminghambusinessalliance.com/up 
loads/PDFs/BBALegislativeUpdate.Newsletter.Issue5.pdf. 
 92. Jefferson I, 474 B.R. at 237. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.; see also Robin Smith, Southern Discomfort: An Examination of the Financial 
Crisis in Jefferson County, Alabama, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 363, 365 (2010). 
 95. Jefferson I, 474 B.R. at 237; see also Smith, supra note 94, at 366. 
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across everyone in the county96 in the form of taxes, fees, assessments, and 
general obligation bonds.97  Instead, the sewer bonds were to be repaid by 
the revenues of a sewer system that was in desperate need of repair.98 
The county soon realized that the sewer-system revenue would not 
cover the payments that had become due on the special revenue bonds.  By 
February 2008, Jefferson County had defaulted on the warrants.99  Two 
months later, the county could not make principal payments on the 
bonds.100  By April, the county and the bondholders had entered into an 
agreement of forbearance of special revenue bond payments.101  After years 
of trying to restructure the debt by laying off hundreds of employees, 
closing facilities, eliminating overtime, and cutting work hours,102 Jefferson 
County filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy in November 2011.103 
Despite the bankruptcy filing, the county was still required to make 
payments on the special revenue bonds with the returns that the sewer 
system generated during the bankruptcy stay.104  However, a dispute arose 
between a trustee of the special revenue bondholders and the county.105  
The trustee and the county disagreed as to which expenses should be 
considered “necessary operating expenses.”106  The county wanted to use 
 
 96. Jefferson I, 474 B.R. at 238. 
 97. Id. at 238–39. 
 98. Id. at 239 (“When sewer usage charges increase beyond a point, the ability of the 
county to obtain revenue from other sources for other purposes is constrained . . . the 
payment of increasing sewer charges takes monies from its residents that might otherwise 
have been available via taxes, assessments, fees, or other means.”); see also David A. 
Rosenzweig & Stanford G. Ladner, The Latest in Jefferson County, LAW360 (July 12, 2012, 
7:27 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/359720/the-latest-in-jefferson-county. 
 99. Jefferson I, 474 B.R. at 241. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 244–45. 
 103. Voluntary Petition, In re Jefferson Cnty., No. 11-05736-TBB9 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
Nov. 9, 2011); see also Lawrence A. Larose & Robert J. Gayda, Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 
Treatment of Special Revenue Bonds in Chapter 9: Where Are We After In re Jefferson 
County, Alabama?, Presentation at the American Bankruptcy Institute 2014 Annual Spring 
Meeting, in Business Track: Municipal Bankruptcies, AM. BANKR. INST., Apr. 2014, 213, 
214, http://materials.abi.org/sites/default/files/2014/Apr/MunicipalBankruptcies.pdf. 
 104. Jefferson II, 474 B.R. 725, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.), amended, 482 B.R. 404 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ala. 2012). 
 105. Id. 
 106. The parties disagreed as to “what expenditures for the County’s sewer system 
[were] payable ahead of payments to those lenders who/which secured payment of interest 
and principal owed” to the special revenue bonds.  Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Jefferson Cnty. 
(In re Jefferson Cnty.) (Jefferson III), 482 B.R. 404, 408 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012); 
Rosenzweig & Ladner, supra note 98. 
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$4.5 million of the sewer revenue each month to pay for professional fees 
consisting primarily of attorney’s fees relating to the bankruptcy 
proceedings and negotiations with bondholders, as well as for depreciation 
and amortization, and for future operating expenses and capital expenditures.107  
The trustee argued that these were not “necessary operating expenses” 
because under the contract governing the trustee’s duties, only the 
expenditures incurred and for which payment is due in the current month 
constituted expenditures that could be taken from the sewer-system 
revenues.108 
To resolve the conflict between the trustee and Jefferson County, the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama had 
to determine the meaning of “necessary operating expenses.”109  In doing 
so, the court first looked to the legislative history of the 1988 amendments 
to the Bankruptcy Code, which created the “necessary operating expenses” 
exception.110  The court noted that when reviewing the legislative history of 
a statute, it is important to determine the purpose of the statute.111  Further, 
the court explained that the legislative history reflected Congress’s desire 
to ensure special “revenue bondholders receive the benefit of their bargain 
with the municipal issuer [and that] they will have unimpaired rights to the 
project revenues pledged to them.”112  However, the report of the United 
States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary indicated that 
the pledged revenues for special revenue bonds are not to be affected by a 
stay of bankruptcy as long as it is consistent with the amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code, including the “necessary operating expenses” 
 
 107. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 409–10; Rosenzweig & Ladner, supra note 98. 
 108. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 410, 414. 
 109. Id. at 431; see also Rosenzweig & Ladner, supra note 98. 
 110. 11 U.S.C. § 928(b) (2012) (“Any such lien on special revenues, other than 
municipal betterment assessments, derived from a project or system shall be subject to the 
necessary operating expenses of such project or system, as the case may be.”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 100-1011, at 8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4122 (“New subsection 
928(b) ensures that in the case of project financing . . . or system financing . . . the lien on 
special revenues will be subordinate to the necessary operating expenses of the project or 
system.”). 
 111. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 432; Witalec & Douglas, supra note 16 (“According to the 
[Jefferson County] court, excerpts from the legislative history of amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code in 1998 . . . were intended to preserve creditors’ liens on municipal special 
revenues that might otherwise be avoided . . . .”). 
 112. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 12 (1988) (“[T]he [1988] amendments insure that revenue 
bondholders receive the benefit of their bargain with the municipal issuer, namely, they will 
have unimpaired rights to the project revenue pledged to them.”). 
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exception.113  Thus, the court concluded, “Congress contemplated leaving a 
pledge of special revenues unaffected unless it is at odds with the policies” 
in the Bankruptcy Code’s exception.114 
According to the Senate Report, a policy of the amendments was that 
special revenues be used to “keep the system or project operating followed 
by payment of interest and principal to lenders.”115  Keeping the system or 
project operating includes funds necessary to both repay the bondholders 
and to deliver services to customers.116  According to the House Report, 
“payment of operating expenses—those necessary to keep the project or 
system going—must be protected so that the project or system can be 
maintained in good condition to generate the [revenue] to repay 
bondholders.”117 After reviewing the legislative records, the court indicated 
that the perimeter of “necessary operating expenses” includes expenses that 
are “expended to keep the system or project operating in the sense 
that . . . [it] is kept in good repair and generating the special revenues, not 
improvements or enhancements,” as well as those that are “directly related 
to the project or system.”118  Necessary operating expenses also include 
“some, but not all operating expenses, which flow from § 928(b) being a 
minimum standard” and those that are “being paid, which is different from 
those that may be incurred and paid in a later time period.”119  Overall, the 
consideration of what would constitute “necessary operating expenses” 
should be, “whether the contracted for pledge allows the system during the 
pendency of the municipal bankruptcy to continue to operate, be in good 
condition, and generate revenues for debt repayment.  It is not that it is the 
 
 113. Id. at 11 (“The automatic stay should specifically be inapplicable to application of 
[pledge revenues for secured bonds].”); Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 434; see also Witalec & 
Douglas, supra note 16, at 5 (“However, [§] 922(d) excludes certain acts from the scope of 
the stay under [§] 922(a) by providing that ‘[n]otwithstanding [§] 362 of this title and 
subsection (a) of this section, a petition filed under this chapter does not operate as a stay of 
application of pledged special revenues in a manner consistent with [§] 927 of this title to 
payment of indebtedness secured by such revenues.’” (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 922(d))). 
 114. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 434. 
 115. Id.; S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 22. 
 116. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 437; S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 22. 
 117. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 437; H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 8 (1988), reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4122. 
 118. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 437. 
 119. Id.; see Larose & Gayda, supra note 103, at 218 (“[T]he Court found that 
‘necessary operating expenses’ meant expenses necessary to keep the sewer system 
operating and to maintain it in good, not perfect, condition so that the system could generate 
revenue necessary to repay the Sewer Warrants and to provide service to the residents of the 
municipality.”). 
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best possible operation, the best maintained, or the best of any possible 
criteria.”120 
The Jefferson County court also noted that a bankruptcy court should 
avoid an item-by-item determination of what constitutes a “necessary 
operating expense.”121  What a system needs to remain in operation is a 
business judgment of the municipality and the lenders.122  That assessment 
should not be second-guessed by a bankruptcy court unless there is 
evidence of unreasonableness or certainty that the § 928(b) standard has not 
been met.123  Bankruptcy courts should defer to the agreement between the 
parties as expressed in their contract.124 
The Jefferson County court noted the absence of a discussion of 
capital expenses and capital expenditures in both the House and Senate 
Reports.125  The omission of capital expenses is significant in determining 
whether those expenses were to be included as part of “necessary operating 
expenses,” the court reasoned, because, just a few months prior to the 
House and Senate’s review of the proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Code, these expenses had previously received a great deal of attention by 
the Report on the National Bankruptcy Conference on Proposed Municipal 
Bankruptcy Amendments.126 The absence of a discussion on capital 
expenditures and expenses indicated that Congress did not intend for these 
expenses to be considered as “necessary operating expenses” of a project or 
system.127 
Overall, the court found that neither depreciation and amortization nor 
capital expenses and capital expenditures are “necessary operating expenses.”128  
The 1988 amendments were created to ensure that special revenues were 
used to pay the special revenue bondholders.129  The county’s plan to take 
$3.6 million per month would hinder this purpose.130  Further, capital 
 
 120. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 441. 
 121. Id. at 440. 
 122. Id. at 441. 
 123. Id. at 442–43. 
 124. Id. at 443. 
 125. Id. at 438; see also S. REP. NO. 100-506 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011 (1988), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4122. 
 126. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 435 (“This National Bankruptcy Conference report was 
part of the floor speeches of the two members of Congress who introduced the bills in their 
respective chambers.”); see also 133 CONG. REC. S16229 (Nov. 12, 1987) (statement of 
Sen. DeConcini); 134 CONG. REC. H77 (Feb. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Edwards). 
 127. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 435. 
 128. Id. at 439; see also Larose & Gayda, supra note 103, at 216. 
 129. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 439; S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 5–7. 
 130. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 439. 
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expenses and expenditures are not the daily expenses required to keep the 
sewer system in operation during the time the county is in Chapter 9 
proceedings.131 Finally, although depreciation and amortization are 
expenses, they were not current operating expenses that would keep the 
sewer system operating.132 
The court considered whether the county could deduct professional 
fees before making special revenue bond payments.133  There were two 
types of professional fees and related costs at issue.  The first type of 
professional fees are the “fees and costs directly related to the efficient and 
economical administration of the sewer system exclusive of those related to 
the county’s chapter 9 bankruptcy case,”134 which all parties agreed were 
properly payable ahead of special revenue bond payments.  The second 
type includes all other professional fees, mostly those related to the 
county’s Chapter 9 case, totaling over $830,000 per month,135 and which 
were disputed.  The court explained that “legal services are never a frill or 
an extra; they are fundamental to the efficient development of a 
reorganization plan.”136  Thus, the court held that the professional fees in 
Jefferson County were “necessary operating expense[s]” that could be paid 
prior to payment of special revenue bonds.137 
B. Lessons Learned from Jefferson County 
Jefferson County can provide guidance to investors as to the type of 
bonds in which to invest and the information to consider prior to making 
that investment.  In addition to looking at interest rates and the security 
backing the bonds, investors should consider how municipal bankruptcy 
can change the risk of their investment based on the type of security 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Mark N. Berman, A Crack in the Armor of the Special Revenue Bond, BANKR. L. 
ALERT 3 (July 31, 2013), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/157872_Bankruptcy_Alert 
_31JULY2013.pdf (discussing the three Jefferson County decisions to explain the rights of 
special revenue bondholders, the indenture between the county and its bankruptcy trustee, 
and the risk to special revenue bondholders of losing priority to professional fees after the 
Jefferson County decisions). 
 134. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 409. 
 135. Id. at 410. 
 136. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Jefferson Cnty. (In re Jefferson Cnty.) (Jefferson IV), 503 
B.R. 849, 900 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2013); see also Berman, supra note 132, at 4 (recognizing 
Chief Judge Bennett’s finding that professional fees are necessary expenses for § 928(b) 
purposes). 
 137. Jefferson IV, 503 B.R. at 902–03. 
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provided, the purpose of the bond, and the kinds of fees that are related to 
the bond. 
First, investors should research the bond under consideration and 
understand the condition of the security, if the bond is secured.  As 
Jefferson County illustrates, the condition of the security is an important 
indicator of a municipality’s ability to honor its obligation after filing for 
bankruptcy.138  This is especially true for special revenue bonds, which rely 
on the amount of revenue that is generated by the underlying project or 
system.  If the special revenue bond-financed project is in poor condition 
and requires costly maintenance, the revenue that it generates will be 
needed for the maintenance and improvement of the project.139  Upon filing 
for bankruptcy, this revenue will be used for that maintenance—a 
“necessary operating expense”—rather than paying back the bond.140  Thus, 
although special revenue bondholders receive payments during a 
municipal-bankruptcy stay, this privilege may be undercut by high costs of 
improvement and maintenance of the secured project.141 
Second, investors should consider the professional fees that will be 
needed for a project to maintain operations, including legal fees associated 
with potential bankruptcy filings.  In a bankruptcy filing, both types of 
professional fees—operational maintenance and litigation—receive priority 
over special-resource bond payments.142  Litigation fees would likely cut 
into the funds available to make payments on special revenue bonds.143  As 
for general obligation bonds, if a municipality is negatively affected by a 
downturn in the economy, it may have to provide more services, but with 
lower revenue collections, and may not be able to raise taxes high enough 
to cover its operational maintenance costs. 
Third, special revenue bondholders should also find comfort in two 
main components of the Jefferson County court’s interpretation of 
“necessary operating expenses.”  The first component is that the court 
 
 138. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Berman, supra note 133, at 3 (discussing Chief Judge Bennett’s finding that 
operating expenses included those funds necessary to maintain the sewer system in good 
enough condition so that it can generate revenue to repay bondholders and, obviously, to 
continue to provide services to the community). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See 11 U.S.C. § 928(b) (2012) (“Any such lien on special revenues, other than 
municipal betterment assessments, derived from a project or system shall be subject to the 
necessary operating expenses of such project or system, as the case may be.”). 
 142. Jefferson IV, 503 B.R. at 902–03 (finding that attorney’s fees were necessary 
operating expenses). 
 143. As seen in Jefferson County, the litigation fees can be enormous.  The attorney’s 
fees in Jefferson County amounted to nearly three quarters of a million dollars per month.  
See Jefferson III, 482 B.R. 404, 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012). 
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required the expenses to be current expenses.144  The time limitation placed 
on municipal expenses prevents a municipality from deducting costs that 
may arise in the future in order to buffer any possible future negative 
consequences.145  Special revenue bondholders, in turn, do not have to 
worry about expenses they cannot anticipate before the municipality files 
for bankruptcy.146 
As for the second component, the Jefferson County court required 
“necessary operating expenses” to be limited in scope.147  Only the 
expenses that keep the project operating in good—not optimum—condition 
and generating revenue will be given priority over the special revenue 
bondholders’ claims.  Although the municipality’s judgment receives 
deference,148 evidence of unreasonable spending can be raised when there 
is a bankruptcy filing, forcing the bankruptcy court to review the 
legitimacy of the municipality’s priority claim and providing special 
revenue bondholders further protection of their claims.149 
Finally, despite the risks associated with special revenue bonds, 
potential bond investors should remember that the Bankruptcy Code favors 
special revenue bondholders.  When Congress amended the Bankruptcy 
Code, it created unique privileges for special revenue bondholders to 
reward them for investing in a municipality.150  All claims during a 
municipal bankruptcy case will be considered in light of this purpose and 
should earn these bondholders—and their priority claims—favor with the 
court.151 
 
 144. Id. at 439 (deciding that depreciation and amortization were expenses, but were not 
necessary operating expenses because they were not part of the day-to-day expenses needed 
to keep the sewer system functioning). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Berman, supra note 133, at 4–5 (arguing that unless municipalities take care to 
draft concise definitions in their contracts with trustees as to what expenses can be paid out 
of project revenues, bondholders’ priority in repayment may be subject to the legal fees 
incurred by the municipality’s bankruptcy proceedings). 
 147. See id. at 3 (noting Chief Judge Bennett’s finding that funds needed to keep the 
sewer in good—but not perfect—condition were “necessary operating expenses”). 
 148. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
 149. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 171 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (reviewing the 
petitioner’s subjective desire to restructure its debts before confirming the municipality’s 
bankruptcy plan). 
 150. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 12 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 8 (1988), reprinted 
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4122; SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 23 (discussing Senate reports 
indicating that Congress wanted special revenue bondholders to be rewarded for investing in 
the municipality); see also supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 151. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 12; H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 8, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4122; SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 26–28 (discussing Senate reports indicating that Congress 
intended to “[make] clear that revenue bondholders are entitled to receive the revenues 
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CONCLUSION 
Municipal bonds, both general obligation bonds and special revenue 
bonds, are beneficial in helping municipalities find funding for their daily 
operations as well as revenue-generating projects.  However, these bonds 
come with the risk that a financially distressed municipality will file for 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy.  General obligation bonds do not have to be paid 
during the bankruptcy proceedings, while special revenue bonds enjoy 
continued investment and principal payments.152  The “necessary operating 
expenses” of projects financed by special revenue bonds, however, can 
overshadow the benefit of the continued payments of special revenue bonds 
during municipal-bankruptcy proceedings. 
Although “necessary operating expenses” has not been defined in the 
Bankruptcy Code, the recent Jefferson County opinions provide insight into 
what Congress intended the phrase to mean.  Operating and maintenance 
costs and professional fees, excluding capital and future expenses, are the 
only fees intended to take priority over special revenue bond payments.  
Investors can look to the Jefferson County bankruptcy to assess the risks 
they face when a municipality files for bankruptcy. 
MaryJane Richardson* 
 
pledged to them without any interference and on a timely basis”); see also supra notes 95–
97 and accompanying text. 
 152. SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 27. 
 * J.D. Candidate 2015, Campbell University School of Law.  The author would like 
to thank Pam McAfee for her guidance while writing this Comment, and for her willingness 
to help and encourage students who are interested in bankruptcy law. 
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